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Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others 
not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of 
duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own 
obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in 
the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a 
right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral 
self-constitution. This view has its critics.  Responding to these objections reveals 
that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong.’ 
At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the 
personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do 
moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion, 
actual.               
I.   INTRODUCTION 
My concern here is with the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral 
wrong.’  The dialectical stance of the article is defensive, trying to 
make a case for the normative grounds as well as for the coherence of 
the concept of a ‘right to do wrong’ in response to various objections 
raised against it.  The article opens with an introduction of the concept 
of a ‘right to do wrong,’ exploring its meaning and arguing for its 
coherence.  The article then turns to its primary concern, which is 
reflecting on the normative grounds of the right to do wrong.  The 
primary question the article attempts to answer is that given that the 
idea of a right to do wrong is conceptually coherent, do such rights 
ever arise in morality.  After introducing the best liberal justification 
for such rights – a justification grounded in the value of personal 
autonomy – and exploring and tentatively rejecting a competing 
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justification – grounded in personal integrity – the article develops the 
idea of a liberal autonomy-based moral right to do moral wrong and 
assesses how this idea fares against objections raised in the literature.           
II.   A RIGHT TO DO WRONG 
Having a right to do wrong entails that the right-holder has a claim on 
others against their interference with the right-holder’s -ing 
regardless of whether or not the right-holder is permitted to (where 
‘’ stands for an active verb).The idea of a right to do wrong 
assumes a view of rights as protected choice;2 in the case of a right to 
do wrong the choice is between right and wrong.  A right to do wrong 
protects the right-holder’s wrongdoing from external interference,3 
such that if a holder of a right to who is also under a duty not to  
chooses to others are under a correlated duty not to interfere with 
the right-holder’s -ing.   
Examples of moral rights to do moral wrong that are common in the 
literature are one’s moral rights not to offer easy rescue to those in 
danger, not to give money to charity, not to help a friend in need, to 
exercise one’s moral right to free speech in order to insult others, and 
one’s moral right to support a racist political party.  All these 
examples assume a moral duty one nevertheless enjoys a moral right 
to violate.  Late-term abortion is another example: some are of the 
opinion that late-term abortion – that is aborting after the fetus has 
become sentient – is morally wrong, but nevertheless are also of the 
opinion that women have the (moral) right to decide to undergo such 
an abortion without external interference.          
Notice that while a right to do wrong must correspond to some duty in 
others, it need not necessarily correspond to the ‘negative’ duty of 
non-interference.  Conceptually, a right may also correlate to 
‘positive’ duties to facilitate, enable, and realize what one has a right 
to.4  The scope and nature (‘positive’ or ‘negative’) of actual rights 
                                                            
1  William  A.  Edmundson,  An  Introduction  to  Rights  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 133‐35.  
2 Edmundson, id. at 135.  
3 Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong”, Ethics 92(1) (1981): pp. 21‐39, 29.  
4 See  Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy  (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice‐Hall, 1973), pp. 
59‐60;  Alon  Harel,  “Theories  of  Rights”,  in  Martin  P.  Golding  and  William  A. 
Edmundson  (eds.),  The  Blackwell Guide  to  Philosophy  of  Law  and  Legal  Theory 
(Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 191‐206, 192.  
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depend not on the concept of ‘right’ but on the norms giving rise to 
those rights.  For example, the (moral) right to vote for a racist party 
is a right to do wrong which has corresponding ‘negative’ duties on 
others not to interfere with one’s voting – such as the duty not to 
block the right-holder’s access to the voting booth – as well as 
affirmative duties to facilitate the right-holder’s voting – such as the 
duty to provide the racist voter with a voting ballot.  For reasons of 
economy, I will mainly use the ‘negative’ language of ‘non-
interference.’ 
Conceptually, the idea of a right to do wrong is most interesting and 
puzzling in cases of a right of one kind to do a wrong of the same 
kind.  How can there be a right (e.g., a moral right) to do what one is 
under a (moral) duty not to do?  And moreover, if one is under a duty 
of one kind (e.g., moral) not to how can others owe one a duty (of 
the same kind, i.e., moral) not to interfere with one’s -ing?  William 
Godwin aptly expressed the sense of perplexity surrounding the idea 
of a right to do wrong, writing that “[t]here cannot be a more absurd 
proposition than that which affirms the right of doing wrong.”5       
This sense of perplexity is, nevertheless, easily dispelled.  First, 
conceptually there is an analytical space for a right to do wrong.  In 
Hohfeldian terms the presumed moral right to do moral wrong is best 
conceived of as a claim-right.6  A claim-right to  entails a claim 
against interference by others with one’s -ing that corresponds to a 
duty in others not to interfere with one’s -ing.  A privilege (or 
liberty) to entails a freedom to r, more accurately, having no 
duty not to Normally claim-rights are accompanied by a privilege, 
so that if one has a claim-right to one is also privileged (or at 
liberty) to (or not to )For example, my right that others not 
censor my ideas is normally coupled with a privilege (or liberty) to 
express those ideas.  Conceptually, however, it is possible to have a 
                                                            
5 William Godwin, “Enquiry Concerning Political  Justice”,  in K. Codell Carter  (ed.) 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 88.  
6  In Hohfeldian  terms, as characterized here,  the moral right  to do wrong  is best 
conceived of as a claim‐right and not a liberty/privilege. This is so even though the 
right  to do wrong  is presented as a  right  to do  something  (), which appears  to 
have the structure of a Hohfeldian privilege.  The essence of the right to do wrong 
is that the right‐holder is not privileged to  yet has a claim on others (who have a 
corresponding duty) that they not interfere with the right‐holder’s –ing.  On this 
see Robert P. George, Making Men Moral (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), pp. 118‐22.    
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claim-right to such that others are under a correlative duty not to 
interfere with one’s -ing, and still lack the liberty to  (i.e., have a 
duty not to The category of a claim-right without privilege opens 
the door for the possibility of a right to do wrong.8  In the example of 
late-term abortion these categories play out as follows: late-term 
abortion is presumably morally wrong so that women are not 
privileged to have them performed, although women do have a claim-
right that others not interfere with their decision to undergo such a 
procedure.       
Second, normatively the mere fact that someone is engaged in 
wrongdoing does not necessarily mandate or even permit others to 
interfere with one’s wrongdoing.9  While the wrongness of one’s 
actions is perhaps a reason for others to interfere, often other 
(weightier) reasons arise against such interference.  Therefore, the fact 
that one’s actions are wrongful does not necessarily entail that 
normatively one cannot have a right – the function of which is to 
forbid the interference of others – to perform them.  And while not all 
reasons against interference need also be reasons for a right against 
such interference, some such reasons certainly may (reasons for a 
right are not merely reasons for a duty of non-interference with A’s -
ing but also for A to hold a correlative claim against such 
interference).   
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a right to do wrong does not 
bear on the rightness or wrongness of the actions the right-holder is 
free to perform; it only bars others from interfering with such actions.  
Thus, while rights to do wrong give others reason not to interfere with 
                                                            
7 See Matthew H. Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N.E. 
Simmonds & Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (Oxford and New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), p. 15; Edmundson,  supra note 1, at 94, 135. For a  strongly  related 
position see Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
pp. 222‐25.   
8 Notice that this Hohfeldian account of the logic and normative structure of rights 
to do wrong  is an explication of the Hohfeldian categories. It  is not an account of 
Hohfeld’s views on  the coherence of  the category of a  ‘right  to do wrong.’   The 
argument here  is  that  the Hohfeldian building blocks allow  for  the category of a 
‘right to do wrong.’  This position is indifferent as to whether or not the category of 
a  ‘right  to  do  wrong’  ever  occurred  to  Hohfeld  himself  or  whether  or  not  he 
considered the category coherent.      
9 Waldron, supra note 3, at 28‐31.  
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the right-holder’s wrongdoing, they do not give reason for the right-
holder herself to do (or not to do) wrongIt is the essence of the right 
to do wrong that what the right-holder is protected to do is not 
necessarily the right thing to do.  One should avoid the impulse to 
associate a right to do with the rightness of -ing as well as to 
equate the reasons for a right to with the reasons for -ing.10  What 
one should keep in mind is that rights matter most in protecting the 
interests and choices of right-holders from external interference, and 
not in validating or justifying those interests and choices.  The main 
function of rights (certainly liberal rights) is, in other words, to protect 
the interests of right-holders and to assure individuals a realm of 
protected choice and a measure of freedom.11 
Finally, notice that although I often refer to ‘a right to do wrong’ I do 
not mean to refer to a pervasive right to do any and all wrong.  Such a 
moral right is prima facie implausible.  It is likely that morality does 
not afford a right to do, for example, particularly egregious wrongs.  
                                                            
10  If  I  follow  his  reasoning  correctly,  Gerhard  Øverland’s  recent  critique  of  the 
concept of a  ‘right to do wrong’ does  just that: conflates reasons for a right with 
reasons for how to exercise the right.  Gerhard Øverland, “The Right to Do Wrong”, 
Law and Philosophy 26(4)  (2007): pp. 377‐404, 385‐89.   Øverland concludes  that 
there can be no right to do wrong.  Because where the reasons in favor of a right 
protecting  A’s  ‐ing  are  sufficiently  strong  to  overcome  the  competing  reasons 
against  the  right, Øverland believes  that  it  is also  the case  that due  to  the same 
weighing of reasons there is no longer any wrong for there to be a right to do.  In 
other words,  if  there are weighty enough moral  reasons  to allow A  to  without 
interference  then  it  follows  that  A’s  ‐ing  is  not  wrongful,  because  there  are 
overriding moral reasons for allowing A to .  Yet, as just explained, a reason for a 
right protecting one’s ‐ing is not necessarily also a reason for exercising that right 
in any specific way. That is, such a reason is not a reason to , but merely a reason 
that one have the protected choice to .   
11 David Enoch has offered a compelling proof of the conceptual coherence of the 
right to do wrong, or as he calls it, “a right to violate one’s duty.”  In broad terms, 
what Enoch demonstrates is that the assumption that there is never a right to do 
wrong yields substantive results to rights theory under all three leading theories of 
rights:  Hohfeldian,  Will  Theory,  and  Interest  Theory.    That  this  assumption  has 
substantive results for rights entails that the assumption – that there is no right to 
do wrong –  is not a conceptual  truth, but a matter of substantive morality.    If  it 
were conceptually  true  that  there  is never a  right  to do wrong,  then assuming  it 
would yield purely conceptual results to a theory of rights and not any substantive 
normative  results.  If  a  substantive  result  follows  from  a  certain  proposition,  it 
follows  that  that proposition  is not a  conceptual  truth.   Therefore, a  right  to do 
wrong is conceptually possible.  David Enoch, “A Right to Violate One’s Duty”, Law 
and Philosophy 21(4/5) (2002): pp. 367‐78, 361. 
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There is, however, more to morality than the great wrongs of the 
world.  In fact, the chief habitat of morality is in the contours of 
everyday life, in which rights to do wrong are probably the most 
pervasive.  The question then is whether, and if so when, do people 
hold a moral right to do some moral wrong.    
III.   THE LIBERAL GROUNDS OF A MORAL RIGHT TO DO MORAL 
WRONG 
Given that a right to do wrong is conceptually coherent, what sort of 
reasons are there for the actuality of such rights?  First, as explained 
above, such reasons are reasons for barring others from interfering 
with wrongdoing, or, in other words, reasons against the enforcement 
of duty.  Second, where a set of reasons gives rise to a right to do 
wrong some such reasons must somehow be for the right-holder.  A 
right to do wrong may also arise from reasons external to the interests 
or liberty of the right-holder.  Yet, no right can arise from purely 
external reasons.  The claim that “[t]here might be rights to do wrong, 
which are not for the sake of the wrongdoer”12 contradicts, I think, an 
essential feature of rights: that they are for the right-holder.  This, I 
believe, is the case under both leading theories on what rights are for.  
Under the Interest (or Benefit) Theory of rights, rights are for the 
well-being of the right-holder.13  While the justification of a right 
need not solely rely on the significance the protected interests of the 
right-holder have for him or her, some of the reasons for the right 
must be situated in the well-being of the right-holder.14  Where the 
reasons against interference are not in any way for or supportive of 
the wrongdoer’s well-being, the wrongdoer may be free to do wrong 
                                                            
12 Øverland, supra note 10, at 379. 
13 The Interest Theory of rights views rights as protectors of right‐holders’ interests 
or well‐being.  See Harel, supra note 4, at p. 195; Edmundson, supra note 1, at pp. 
120‐22.  
14 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 149‐51.   Obviously often  the  importance of one’s  right  is much 
greater than the  importance, for the right‐holder, of the particular  interest of the 
right‐holder  that  is  protected  by  the  right.    Consider  the  following  example: 
imagine two people with an equal  interest  in having a particular shirt.    It  is clear 
that  the  one who  legally  owns  the  shirt  should have  a  right  to  it.   But  as  their 
interest  gives  them equal  claim  to  the  shirt,  this  can only be because  the  right‐
holder’s ownership of the shirt is a reason for giving it to him that is greater than 
his  interest  in the shirt.   His (moral) right to the shirt does not, therefore, merely 
reflect his  interest  in  the  shirt, but  adds  to  it  an  additional  independent  reason 
based on the importance of protecting legal property rights. 
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in the sense that there is a duty on others not to interfere, yet under 
such circumstances the wrongdoer’s freedom to do wrong would not 
derive from her right to such freedom.   
According to the Choice (or Will) Theory of rights, rights are for the 
right-holder in that they are protective of her freedom or autonomy.15   
In a sense, the Choice Theory is a sub-category of the Interest 
Theory.16  Under a Choice Theory of rights reasons against 
interference with wrongdoing only establish a right of the wrongdoer 
against such interference if those reasons justify giving the wrongdoer 
the power or discretion to decide whether to enforce the right or to 
relinquish it and consent to the interference.17  Under the Choice 
Theory a normative constellation not exhibiting such an empowering 
and protection of the would-be right-holder’s freedom and autonomy 
simply does not comprise a right.  Where the reasons for non-
interference are purely external to the wrongdoer – not for giving the 
wrongdoer any control over others’ duty of non-interference – they 
may provide for the side-effect of freedom to wrong with impunity, 
but such reasons do not grant the wrongdoer the right to do wrong 
with impunity.     
A. Personal Autonomy  
The most promising ideal taken as a reason for a right to do wrong – 
in the sense of how such rights are for the right-holder – is grounded 
in the value of personal autonomy.18  And it is the view I develop and 
defend here.  The liberal ideal of personal autonomy is that 
                                                            
15  According  to  the  Will  (or  Choice)  Theory  of  rights,  rights  protect  the  right‐
holder’s exercise of choice,  inherently concerned with the right‐holder’s freedom 
and autonomy.  See Harel, supra note 4, at pp. 194‐95; Edmundson, supra note 1, 
at 119‐20, 122‐32.  
16 See Raz, supra note 14, at 149‐50 n. 10; Edmundson, supra note 1, at 127.   
17  Edmundson,  supra  note  1,  at  144;  Leif  Wenar,  “The  Nature  of  Rights”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 33(3) (2005): pp. 223‐52, 238. 
18 In his 1981 essay on the right to do wrong Waldron refers to “personal integrity” 
and not to  ‘autonomy’ as the source of the significance of the right to do wrong.  
Yet, much in Waldron’s argument seems nevertheless better aligned with the idea 
of  autonomy.    Supra  note  3,  at  34‐5.    Moreover,  in  a  short  piece  from  1983 
Waldron explicitly refers to “autonomy” as the grounding value of his conception 
of a right to do wrong.  Jeremy Waldron, “Galston on Rights”, Ethics (93)(2) (1983): 
pp.  325‐37,  326.   David  Enoch  also  endorses  the  autonomy‐based  account  of  a 
right to do wrong.  Enoch, supra note 11, at 379‐80.   
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individuals possess a measure of self-governance and self-
determination over their lives and identity.  As Joseph Raz puts it,  
[t]he ruling idea behind the idea of personal autonomy is that people should 
make their own lives.  The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own 
life.  The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to 
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions 
throughout their lives.19 
And,  
[a]utonomy means that a good life is a life of free creation.20   
Gerald Dworkin’s formulation is also illuminating:  
autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect 
critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and 
the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order 
preferences and values.  By exercising such a capacity, persons define their 
nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for 
the kind of person they are.21  
In short, autonomy is self-sovereignty, self-constitution, self-
formation, self-definition, and self-determination of one’s life and 
identity.22         
Certain actions and decisions individuals make are self-defining or 
self-constituting in this sense.  Self-defining choices may maintain or 
steer a person’s life in a certain direction or put it on a particular 
trajectory.  Moreover, such choices are formative of ‘who one is’ in 
that through them one defines or determines aspects and attributes of 
him- or herself, which are central to one’s identity.  The liberal 
tradition has identified a number of typical realms of choice that are 
often particularly important for personal autonomy and self-
constitution.  These include choices of political affiliation and 
activity, intimate relations, public expression of opinion, association, 
                                                            
19  Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom  (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 
1986), p. 369.  
20 Id., at 412. 
21 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 20.    
22 In what follows I use these terms interchangeably with ‘autonomy.’ 
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commitments, values, occupation, and life-projects.23  Now of course 
no single choice is determinate of one’s autonomy, but these are the 
type of choices and realm of choices in which freedom of choice is 
typically considered crucial for an autonomous life.  There are 
certainly others.    
According to liberal morality those aspects of people’s lives, which 
are often partially determinative of ‘who one is,’ are uniquely 
valuable (or of disvalue) when freely chosen, because as such they 
contribute to an autonomous life.  Thus, all other things being equal, 
even if valuable in and of themselves, where values, virtues, 
commitments, affiliations, life-projects, etc. are externally imposed, 
lesser value is generated than when freely chosen.  Moreover, many 
such values are, by their own lights, only valuable if engaged in 
autonomously.  In instances involving self-constituting moral choices 
there is a significant difference in value between doing right out of 
choice and doing right out of coercion, compulsion, or the deterring 
effect of expected sanction.  Accordingly, liberal rights arise to assure 
that these various identity-forming attributes, be they attachments, 
associations, personal relations, values, political actions, public 
expressions, moral character and so on are freely chosen and formed, 
at least to a degree.  As such, the moral ground for liberal rights is 
instrumental: they are rights in the service of personal autonomy, 
requiring that individuals have sufficient freedom of choice, both in 
kind and in number, between self-constituting options.       
Still, how does the value of autonomy ground a right to make morally 
wrongful choices?  This question appears to persist even having 
accepted that autonomy mandates a sufficient measure of freedom to 
choose from various options that are significantly related to 
individuals’ steering of the course of their own lives and to the 
formation of their own identity.  The most appealing answer is that 
without a right to do wrong individuals would not have sufficient 
‘breathing room’ to autonomously determine ‘who they are.’  Self-
forming choices are often value-laden, and values often evoke moral 
issues.  A person’s freedom to make morally sensitive choices, which 
are often among the choices that matter most for self-constitution, is 
essential to any rich and meaningful autonomous self-formation.  
And, the argument goes, having a right to choose wrongfully is a 
condition for having the autonomy over such morally saturated issues 
                                                            
23 See e.g., Waldron, supra note 3, at 34‐35. 
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and aspects of life or, more generally, it is a condition for an 
autonomous life.  As such, the right to do wrong is a liberal right.   
This conception of the liberal right to do wrong has been subjected to 
forceful criticism.  Explaining and developing these critiques and 
attempting to assess how the liberal right to do wrong fairs in relation 
to them is the focus of Section IV.  But before turning to assessing 
and defending the autonomy argument for rights to do wrong, we 
must assess the viability of a competing value for the normative 
grounds of such rights.            
B. Personal Integrity  
Some view personal integrity as the primary value giving reason for 
rights to do wrong.  One proponent of this position is Robert 
George.24  Jeremy Waldron too refers to “personal integrity” as the 
value furthered by a right to do wrong.25  Following John Finnis, 
George appears to view the value of personal integrity as the ideal of 
having a coherent and harmonious identity and sense of self.26  
According to this position it is people’s interest in integrity that 
requires affording individuals the protected choice to act in 
furtherance of their integrity, even if doing so may require 
wrongdoing.   
I however doubt whether, as a conceptual matter, personal integrity – 
as just described – can function as a reason for a right that has the 
structure of a protected choice, such as the right to do wrong.  As 
explained above, a reason for a right to do wrong is not a reason to do 
wrong but rather a reason for having a protected choice to do wrong.  
An integrity reason for a right to do wrong therefore must have the 
form of a reason for having the protected choice (i.e., a right) to do 
evil as one’s integrity mandates.  I do not believe that personal 
integrity functions as such a reason.             
                                                            
24 George, supra note 6, at 124‐25.  
25  Yet,  as  explained  above,  although  his  position  is  not  entirely  clear  much  in 
Waldron’s  discussion  of  personal  integrity  is  actually  in  line  with  the  ideal  of 
autonomy.    See  supra  note  18.    Andrew  Cohen  also  appears  to  count  integrity 
among  the  grounds  of  the  right  to  do  wrong.    Andrew  I.  Cohen,  “Virtues, 
Opportunities,  and  the  Right  to  Do  Wrong”,  Journal  of  Social  Philosophy  28(2) 
(1997): pp. 43‐55. 
26 George,  supra note 6, at p. 24.   For Finnis,  integrity  is an aspect of  the more 
general  basic  value  of  what  he  calls  “practical‐reasonableness.”    John  Finnis, 
Natural Rights and Natural Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 88‐9.   
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Consider the following example.  A person is said to hold a right to 
(wrongfully) side with a bigoted cause because the values the cause 
stands for are imbedded in that person’s beliefs, values, religion, 
personal history, core communal attachments, and social 
commitments, and because failing to side with the bigoted cause 
would greatly erode and clash with those core aspects of that person’s 
identity.  The presumed reason for this person holding a right to side 
with bigotry without interference is that were the person prevented 
from taking this stance, perverse as it may be, it would result in a 
substantial detriment to his or her identity and sense of self.  That is, it 
would erode this person’s integrity.  In the cases in which the reasons 
for acting in furtherance of one’s integrity prevail over competing 
reasons for action, what I suspect we will find is that the wrongness of 
one’s presumed wrongdoing in siding with a bigoted cause is 
outweighed by the severity of the damage to one’s integrity (for 
example, some deep crisis in one’s deeply held religious beliefs were 
one prevented from acting as one’s integrity mandates).  The point 
being that the reason not to interfere with the bigot’s conduct is that 
under the circumstances he is, all things considered, doing as value 
requires.  Where the presumed disvalue found in the loss of integrity 
is greater than the disvalue of acting in furtherance of other values, 
one should act in furtherance of integrity.  And, following the same 
value calculus and assuming away external reasons for interference, 
others should not interfere with the agent’s actions in furtherance of 
his or her integrity.     
If true, this points to a deep conceptual problem with grounding rights 
to do wrong in the value of personal integrity. Namely, integrity 
seems unable to justify a right to do wrong.  Integrity appears to 
function as a reason for an action and not as a reason for a right to 
choose that action.  Because if the integrity reasons for -ing 
outweigh the reasons against -ing there are conclusive reasons to  
as well as (excluding, in favor of simplification, any external reasons) 
not to interfere with one’s justified -ing.  Φ-ing under these 
circumstances is not wrongful but justified.  So while integrity gives 
reason to and for non-interference with one’s -ing it does not give 
reason for a right to do wrong, because when such reasons prevail -
ing appears justified.  
Moreover, following this line of reasoning it is not clear to me 
whether personal integrity is indeed at all a reason for a right to do 
(regardless of the question of whether or not -ing is a wrong).  As 
already explained, a reason for a right to is not a reason to but 
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rather a reason for affording the right-holder, through non-
interference, the freedom to or not to as she chooses.  Preserving 
and furthering one’s integrity through one’s own actions does not 
necessarily require that one freely choose those actions.  Rather, it 
simply requires that one act in furtherance of one’s own integrity.  
Where -ing is crucial for one’s integrity, integrity is a reason for -
ing that suggests some goodness in -ing as well as a reason for 
others not to interfere with one’s -ing, but it is not necessarily a 
reason for giving one the right to The right to is the right to 
choose without interference whether to or not to .  And, it is not 
clear to me why one’s integrity-interests in -ing would function as a 
reason for allowing one to choose not only to but also not to 
especially where not -ing is detrimental to one’s integrity.  
Integrity, as defined above, does not mandate choice and autonomy,27 
and therefore where one’s integrity is a reason for one to  and that 
others not interfere with one’s -ing it is not a reason that one have 
the choice to  (and by extension not to ) and that others not 
interfere with one’s not -ing.  In other words, integrity may be a 
reason to but it is not a reason for a right to .28       
Notice that this refutation of the integrity account (as defined above) 
of moral rights to do moral wrong is not applicable against the 
autonomy account for such rights.  Autonomy reasons are reasons for 
affording the agent (of whom it is the autonomy of) a right to choose 
how to act.  In contrast, as just explained, integrity reasons give the 
agent (of whom it is the integrity of) reasons for how to act.  
Autonomy reasons are reasons for others not to infringe on the 
freedom of the person it is the autonomy of.  Such reasons do not bear 
on how one should exercise the protected freedom of choice one has, 
but only that one should hold a right to make such choices freely.  In 
contrast, as we just saw, integrity reasons give reason for action not 
only to others (not to setback and/or further one’s integrity) but also 
to the person it is the integrity of.  Integrity reasons are reasons for 
one to act as one’s integrity mandates.         
                                                            
27 Autonomy, in contrast, may require a measure of integrity.  See Raz, supra note 
19, at 381‐85.  
28  I see one exception  to my position.   Where –ing  is a condition  for preserving 
personal integrity, reasons of integrity may support a right to  where such a right 
is practically the best path to assure that one actually s.    In such cases  integrity 
gives  instrumental  reasons  for  a  right  to  .    This  is  unlike  the  autonomy‐
justification for a right to  where the interest in having a choice directly grounds 
the right.      
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Relatedly, unlike integrity reasons, autonomy reasons for a protected 
choice to are not reasons that bear on the rightness or wrongness of 
-ing.  Thus, where autonomy reasons prevail in giving rise to a right 
to it does not necessarily follow that -ing is morally right.  Which 
is why autonomy reasons can give rise to a right to do wrong.  In 
contrast, as we saw above, where integrity reasons for allowing one to 
prevail over competing reasons it follows that -ing is justified, 
which is why such reasons cannot give rise to a right to do wrong.       
IV.   ASSESSING THE RIGHT TO DO WRONG: HOW MUCH CHOICE IS 
REQUIRED?  
A.  The Demands of Autonomy  
Having laid out the conceptual and normative foundations of a liberal 
autonomy-based right to do wrong, I now turn to assessing whether 
this right survives the objections raised against it in the literature.  My 
focus here is on defending and assessing the viability of the normative 
liberal grounds for rights to do wrong.   
Must individuals have rights to violate their moral duties in order to 
have a sufficient array of morally permissible self-constituting choices 
to satisfy the demands of autonomy?  Another way of putting the 
issue is to ask whether the range and scope of the self-constitutive 
choices individuals presumably have – even in the absence of rights to 
do wrong – satisfy the demands of personal autonomy?   
Waldron’s position suggests that they do not.29  Waldron explains that 
characteristically the spectrum of choice open to individuals 
comprises options that are (a) morally called for, (b) subject to moral 
criticism, and (c) options to which morality is indifferent.30  
According to Waldron, in the absence of a right to do wrong rights 
would only protect choice between morally permissible options, 
which would result in rights protecting only morally permissible 
choices.  This would result in individuals having no morally protected 
freedom of choice in matters touching on morality.  Because, 
according to Waldron, in a universe without rights to do wrong, 
whenever faced with a set of morally permissible choices, one choice 
– the one morally called for – would dominate all other choices, in 
effect making all other options morally impermissible and leaving 
                                                            
29 Waldron, supra note 3, at 31‐7. 
30 For purposes of simplification Waldron brackets supererogatory options. 
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individuals with no course of action but for the morally dominating 
option, effectively affording individuals no choice at all.  In such a 
universe freedom of choice would only persist where the possible 
options do not involve morality (so that no one choice can come to 
morally dominate all others).  The worry is that considering the 
unique significance and centrality moral issues play in people’s lives, 
personal autonomy cannot flourish where people lack any freedom of 
choice in such matters.      
William Galston and George are critical of Waldron’s argument.31  
According to them having a set of options that are undominated (i.e., 
none are morally inferior) yet still all morally permissible is a 
common feature of morality.  Accordingly, Waldron is naïve to think 
that there is typically a morally called for option that therefore 
dominates all other options.  Galston and George seem to believe that 
the realm of what is morally permissible normally contains an array of 
options that are in some sense incommensurate, incomparable, or are 
equally good (the latter would be cases of ‘ties at the top’).  For 
example, individuals may choose between different and even 
contradicting morally permissible yet mutually incomparable, 
undominated, and unranked (in order of moral priority) religious 
paths, political forms of activism, commitments, attachments, 
personal relationships, social affiliations, professions, forms of life 
etc.  Rights that are protective of such vast arrays of options assure 
individuals a wide range of self-constituting sets of choices, providing 
for conditions that easily satisfy the demands of personal autonomy.   
Much here turns on whether one recognizes the pervasiveness of 
incommensurability and incomparability in people’s potential options.  
My sentiments are with those who view incommensurability or 
incomparability as a significant aspect of life and of the nature of 
value.32  Yet this is a contested position.33  Accordingly, assuming 
such pervasive incommensurability or incomparability, there is reason 
                                                            
31  Williiam  A.  Galston,  “On  the  Alleged  Right  to  Do  Wrong:  A  Response  to 
Waldron”, Ethics 93(2) (1983): pp. 320‐24, at 321‐23; George, supra note 6, at 126‐
28. 
32  See  e.g., Raz,  supra note 19,  at 321‐68;  Joseph Raz,  “Incommensurability  and 
Agency,”  in  R.  Chang  (ed.),  Incommensurability,  Incomparability,  and  Practical 
Reason (Cambridge M.A. and London: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 110‐28. 
33 For a compelling argument and a critical survey of different views  favoring the 
position  that  incomparability  is  a  common  feature  of  value,  see  Ruth  Chang, 
“Introduction,”  in  Incommensurability,  Incomparability, and Practical Reason,  Id., 
at 1‐34.  
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to think that morality provides individuals with a sufficiently rich 
plethora of choices to satisfy the demands of autonomy without 
allowing right-holders to choose to do wrong.  
Are these self-constituting choices, which individuals presumably 
may have even in the absence of rights to do wrong, indeed enough?  
Clearly, all other things being equal, a world with a right to do wrong 
offers individuals more options than a world without such a right, the 
rich array of choices Galston and George argue for notwithstanding.  
But this observation does not entail that the autonomy argument for a 
right to do wrong necessarily survives its critics.   
It seems sensible to postulate that there is a threshold beyond which 
having more choice adds little to nothing to individual autonomy.  
More choice does not, in other words, always entail more autonomy.  
In fact, at times more choice is too much choice, adversely affecting 
individuals’ freedom34 and ability to deliberate and choose rationally 
in ways that foster autonomy.35  It seems reasonable to argue that 
even prior to reaching this threshold of saturation in terms of a 
number or complexity of choices, the weight of the demands of 
personal autonomy decreases with the growth in the number and 
variety of self-constituting choices people have.  The autonomy 
reasons for a right to do wrong are weightier in relation to assuring 
individuals few self-constituting choices than they are in relation to 
assuring that individuals have more such choices.  And the crux of 
Galston and George’s position is that individuals have a wide range of 
important choices even without a right to do wrong.  For example, 
George points out that even within highly restrictive worldviews on 
personal morality, such as traditional forms of Christianity or 
Judaism, people are still left with a range of morally permitted options 
that are enough to fill a whole lifetime with self-constituting 
choices.36        
Whether or not autonomy calls for a right to do wrong depends on 
various contingent circumstances determinative of both the type 
(different aspects of self-constitution may require different types of 
choices) and range (how much choice one has of each type) of self-
                                                            
34 See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 62‐84. 
35  For  a  well‐known  empirical  account  of  the  debilitating  effects  of  too  many 
choices in the context of consumerism, see Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice, 
Why More is Less (Harper‐Collins, 2004).  
36 George, supra note 6, at 127.  
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constituting choices individuals happen to have.  And, factual 
circumstances may vary with time and place and between individuals.  
Under some circumstances the autonomy argument may ground 
certain rights to do wrong and in other circumstances, in which 
circumstances allow for a range of morally permissible options 
sufficient for meaningful self-constitution, autonomy reasons lack 
sufficient weight to ground such rights.   
While powerful, Galston and George’s counter to the autonomy 
argument is therefore not a knockdown argument.  Whether or not a 
certain person has a right to perform a certain wrong largely depends 
on the contingent circumstances.  It is hard to demonstrate that a 
sufficient range or choice – both in number and type – always exists.  
Yet, if what the value of autonomy calls for is a wide range of paths 
and forms of life to choose from, it seems that at least in some social 
circumstances (although not in all) people can do without rights to do 
wrong, at least in relation to some aspects of their lives.       
B.  Autonomy as Moral Self-Constitution 
But there are autonomy reasons for a right to do wrong that the 
various morally permissible choices Galston and George point to 
cannot satisfy, categorically.  Having a right to choose to do wrong 
contributes uniquely to personal autonomy through its contribution to 
moral self-constitution.  A central aspect of self-constitution turns on 
autonomously determining the nature of one’s moral self: whether – 
in relation to the various aspects of morality – one is virtuous or 
wicked, good or evil, moral or immoral.  Such moral self-constitution 
is only possible if one is afforded the freedom to make morally wrong 
choices.  Simplistically put, being good is only a meaningful or 
autonomous choice – in terms of the self-constitution of one’s moral 
self – if one has some freedom to choose to be bad.  The autonomous 
self-development of an integral moral (or immoral) identity mandates 
therefore allowing a measure of choice between good and evil, right 
and wrong, virtue and vice.37  It calls, in other words, for a right to do 
(at least some) wrong.  Rights that only protect choices spanning 
between the paths of the saint (the supererogatory), the righteous (the 
moral person), and the mere ‘good egg’ (the non-evil person) fall 
short of securing the range of choice required for moral self-
constitution.  To put the idea crudely and running the risk of sounding 
like a televangelist, in order to truly constitute oneself as morally 
                                                            
37 For a similar line of reasoning see Cohen, supra note 25, at 46‐7.  
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good, individuals must be allowed some opportunity to choose to 
become bad, which requires having a choice to do (at least some) 
wrong.  For example, accepting that charity is morally right and that 
there is a moral duty to show a measure of charity, had one lacked the 
right to violate this duty one could become a charitable person, but 
could one truly self-constitute oneself as a charitable person?    
Note that moral self-constitution requires a range of moral choices 
that are, to a degree, recurring.  No single choice or even type of 
choice between a wrongful option and a moral option is determinative 
in forming one into a moral or a wicked person.  Also, one may be 
moral in some respects in relation to certain issues and not to others.  
And, different choices may contribute to forming such different 
aspects of one’s moral nature.  Moreover, there is a cumulative aspect 
to choices that form one’s moral makeup.  How one faces a single 
moral dilemma does not determine one’s moral self.  In addition, an 
individual’s moral character may change and fluctuate throughout 
life, requiring one to reaffirm or restore one’s moral character.  Thus, 
a measure of various wrongful choices is needed throughout one’s life 
to assure the opportunity for moral self-constitution.   
Still, one should avoid overstating the point.  Although having more 
than a single choice between good and evil is required for moral 
autonomy, there is a threshold of moral choice beyond which having a 
greater number of choices makes little difference to moral self-
constitution.  In addition, clearly one need not have a choice to do all 
types of wrongs in order to have sufficient range of moral choices for 
moral self-constitution.  Finally, one’s autonomy interests in a right to 
do wrong are most likely never weighty enough to justify a right to 
highly egregious wrongdoing.   
George argues that even assuming individuals indeed have a 
genuinely unique autonomy-driven interest in a freedom to choose to 
do wrong, such an interest does not give rise to a right to do wrong.  
According to him even without a right to do wrong individuals 
normally enjoy sufficient opportunities to choose evil over virtue 
without interference.38  George does not offer an example, yet one 
possible scenario is that occasionally others are under a duty not to 
interfere with one’s wrongdoing, where the duty is sufficiently 
supported by reasons wholly unrelated to one’s interests in having the 
freedom to do wrong.  Morality here may prescribe sufficient freedom 
                                                            
38 George, supra note 6, at 128.  
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to choose wrong even without providing for a right to do so.  For 
example, even assuming that lying is morally wrong, the moral and 
administrative costs of enforcing a ban on lying would be morally 
prohibitive.  The moral reasons prohibiting such a ban may have 
nothing to do with people’s interests in lying, yet will of course have 
the effect of offering a measure of freedom, even if not a right, to lie.    
A related argument against the right to do wrong is that even without 
a duty of non-interference with other people’s wrongdoing many 
choices to do wrong would go unchecked and even unnoticed.  And, 
again, where individuals enjoy a sufficient degree of freedom to do 
wrong, the reasons from moral autonomy for a right to do wrong are 
satisfied or are at least diminished, becoming too weak to support a 
right to do wrong.  A position George advocates and that Joseph Raz 
may be interpreted to hold.39   
It is, however, worth noticing that such a de facto freedom to do 
wrong may offer less in terms of furthering personal autonomy than a 
right to do wrong.  One has de facto freedom to do wrong where 
others are under a duty not to so interfere with one’s wrongdoing or 
even when others, who may be permitted and even obligated to 
interfere, just happen not to.  Yet such duty or factual lack of 
interference do not provide for the same measure of freedom to do 
wrong as does a right against such interference.  The cutting edge of 
the right to do wrong is that it gives the right-holder a moral claim to 
enforce the duty of non-interference on others.  Autonomy has a 
subjective component to it, by which I mean to point out that in order 
to be autonomous people must believe and, in some sense, feel that 
they are autonomous.  Lacking a right to violate their duty, it is not 
unlikely that some individuals will be nevertheless reticent to consider 
violating the duty or will not feel free to do so even if enjoying a de 
facto freedom to violate their duty.  As is demonstrated in the 
numerous instances of people invoking their rights to against 
allegations of their wrongdoing through -ing, rights often have a 
strong liberating and insulating (even if not justifying) effect.  Having 
a right tends to assure individuals some measure of empowerment to 
ignore the judgment of others and to feel that the choice of whether or 
not to do wrong really is subject to their own judgment.  The feeling 
of freedom is partially determinate of freedom, and what people feel 
is not purely determined by reason.  Rights of course do not always 
have such empowering psychological effects, but when they do I 
                                                            
39 George, id.; Raz, supra note 19, at 380‐81.  
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believe that they offer a sense of freedom that is hospitable for 
personal autonomy to a degree that is less found in circumstances of a 
mere de facto freedom.  Moreover, there are also epistemological 
factors at play here.  Individuals enjoying a de facto freedom to do 
wrong are not necessarily aware of it or of its extent and reliability, 
and may therefore still fear reprisal.  Thus, if the freedom to choose 
wrong uniquely fosters moral self-constitution, then mere opportunity 
to do wrong, as opposed to a right to do wrong, may not always 
suffice to realize the autonomy-based value of moral self-constitution.       
Once again, therefore, whether or not the demands of personal 
autonomy are weighty enough to give rise to a right to do wrong 
depends on factual circumstances and not on analysis.  Perhaps 
ironically it seems that the more efficient one’s environment is in 
terms of imposing morality and moral character, the fewer 
opportunities to choose to do wrong one has and the more weighty the 
autonomy reasons for a right to do wrong become.  Moreover, as 
claimed above, different types of choices to do wrong may contribute 
differently to one’s moral self, which, depending on variations in the 
social enforcement of such duties, may suggest having a right to do 
certain wrongs and not others.          
C.  The Value of Autonomous Wrongdoing 
The argument I just endorsed based on the importance rights to do 
wrong have for moral self-constitution faces another objection, based 
on the presumed disvalue of autonomous wrongdoing.  Yet, although 
formidable, I believe this objection is surmountable.   
George claims that autonomy does not ground a right to do wrong 
because, and here he relies on Raz, “autonomy is valuable only if 
exercised in pursuit of the good.”40  For Raz, it seems that there is 
actually more disvalue in choosing or acting badly where the choice 
or action involves higher degrees of autonomy.41  Wrongdoing that is 
not autonomous is somehow less bad.  I concur.  Raz does not directly 
discuss the issue of a right to do wrong, but the presumed Razian 
objection to the right to do wrong is that if what grounds the right is 
the value of autonomy and accepting that autonomous pursuit of the 
bad is, at best, valueless, it appears that the right to do wrong has no 
                                                            
40 George, supra note 6, at 124 n. 20, quoting Raz, id., at 381.   
41 Raz, id., at 380, 412.  
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normative legs to stand on.42  If autonomy embodied in or achieved 
through exercising the right to do wrong is indeed valueless – or even 
of a disvalue – what then is the point of such a right?  Autonomy does 
not, according to Raz, justify wrongdoing and therefore, it seems to 
follow, autonomy cannot justify a right to do wrong.  Thus, the 
objection appears to lead to concluding that the value of personal 
autonomy may only ground a right to do what is morally permitted.        
One partial response to this objection is to point out that autonomous 
wrongdoing may further good in the long run.  Doing wrong and later 
coming to regret it and learning from one’s errors is not an unfamiliar 
path towards moral self-constitution.43  Thus, there is a benefit in 
terms of moral self-constitution to giving individuals the freedom to 
do wrong as a way of setting the conditions for subsequent contrition 
and as a step in self-directed moral development.  Naturally even 
where such benefits to moral self-constitution justify rights to do 
certain wrongs, they obviously do not justify a right to do all wrongs.  
For example, the benefits that murder had for Raskolnikov’s moral 
development hardly afforded him the right to kill the pawnbroker.          
Second, and more importantly, the objection does not rule out the 
value a right to do wrong holds as a condition for moral self-
constitution.  As Raz points out, the fact that one autonomously 
engages in wrongdoing adds no value to one’s valueless conduct or 
choice.  In fact, Raz believes that “autonomously choosing the bad 
makes one’s life worse than a comparable non-autonomous life.”44  In 
contrast, autonomously pursuing good is of value.  In allowing for a 
choice to pursue the bad, the right to do wrong allows for the 
conditions of exercising autonomy in the pursuit of the good.  It is of 
course often possible to pursue good autonomously even without the 
freedom to do wrong, because one may autonomously choose 
between all morally valuable options.  Yet, what the right to do wrong 
assures is that in choosing an option that is good one is also, more 
broadly, choosing good over bad.  And a choice to do good deriving 
from a deliberation between good and evil potentially contributes to 
one’s moral self-constitution as a moral person.  It is that exercise of 
autonomy – manifested in choosing good over evil – that the right to 
do wrong enables.  The liberal right to do wrong does not, therefore, 
derive from the self-constituting value of autonomous wrongdoing, 
                                                            
42 Id., at 411‐12.   
43 For a similar position see Cohen supra note 25, at 53. 
44 Id., at 412.  
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but from the fact that the self-constituting value found in freely 
pursuing The Good (as opposed to a good) is only morally 
permissible if one is free to pursue The Bad.  Put slightly differently, 
the value of the right to do wrong is in enabling or in setting the 
conditions for the self-constituting value of freely choosing the good, 
which requires a right to freely choose the bad.  If one had no option 
to choose evil one’s choosing of the moral would not involve 
autonomous moral self-constitution as a moral person because one 
would have no alternative but to choose options that are morally 
permitted.       
There is, nevertheless, a second Razian hurdle to contend with.  Raz’s 
position is that choosing an option that is morally good over one that 
is morally bad does not involve an exercise of autonomy at all,45 even 
if one is in a sense free to choose the evil option.  According to Raz 
an exercise of autonomy mandates a choice between at least two 
options that are both good (or, presumably at least, morally 
permissible).46  Accordingly, a choice that does not admit several 
moral options but only a choice between a moral and an immoral 
option is not autonomous.47  Raz’s reasoning is that when faced with a 
choice between a good and an evil a person’s choice of the good is in 
a sense coerced and, therefore, is not autonomous.  As Raz puts it, a 
person faced with a choice between good and evil is coerced because 
“[i]f he is to be moral then he has no choice, just as the person 
struggling for physical survival has no choice if he is to stay alive.”48  
When an agent is faced with a choice that in effect challenges what 
Raz calls the agent’s “moral survival,” the choosing of the good is not 
autonomous because what other choice can one really make?   
I believe that Raz’s reasoning undoubtedly captures cases of coercion.  
An agent really is faced with only one viable or acceptable option if 
all other options challenge one or more of the agent’s basic tenets, 
deep beliefs, values, commitments, attachments, physical survival, 
morality, or religious convictions.  What I have in mind are cases in 
which a person’s integrity or mere existence is so severely 
                                                            
45 Id., at 378‐80. 
46 Id. 
47 It appears that for Raz if a choice is between valueless options that are not evil – 
i.e.,  morally  permitted  but  with  no  value  –  choosing  would  involve  genuine 
exercise of autonomy that is, nevertheless, valueless. 
48 Raz, supra note 19, at 380. 
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endangered by a certain course of action that the person is compelled 
to choose any other available alternative.  Thus, while the person 
under such circumstances is seemingly given a choice in the sense 
that he is not subject to any external force blocking him from 
choosing, the person’s liberty is in a sense ‘internally’ blocked.  For 
example, was Thomas More autonomous in choosing between the 
gallows and his religious beliefs?  I think not.  More’s martyrdom is 
that he was coerced to choose death and not that he autonomously 
chose it, because for More the only alternative path to death – defying 
the Catholic Church – was, in a sense, impossible for him to take.  
Had More acquiesced, he would no longer have been More.         
Yet, it is not at all clear to me that such coercion is duplicated in 
circumstances where one’s choice between an evil and a moral option 
does not pose a significant threat to one’s basic values, attachments, 
or moral tenets.  In fact, where moral choice seems most significant to 
determining one’s moral self is where one’s moral makeup is not fully 
formed in relation to the issue at hand or where an immoral person is 
given the choice of moral self-transformation.  Following Raz’s logic 
seems to suggest that under such circumstances the agent does have 
autonomy in choosing between good and evil, and if the agent were to 
choose well that exercise of autonomy would be of value.  In such 
cases choosing evil does not endanger the agent’s integrity and is 
therefore potentially autonomous, and choosing the good would be a 
valuable exercise of that autonomy.  In cases not involving coercion, 
therefore, there is conditional value in the right to do wrong that 
derives from the value of choosing good as an instrument of moral 
self-constitution.  This conditional autonomy-based value of the 
freedom to choose between good and evil gives reason for a right to 
such a choice, i.e., for a right to do (some) wrong. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Are there moral rights to do moral wrong?  I began with an 
explanation of the concept of a ‘right to do wrong’ and with a defense 
(mostly rooted in the literature) of its coherence.  I then assessed and 
rejected an integrity-based justification for rights to do wrong and 
argued for grounding such rights in the value of personal autonomy.  I 
thereupon set out to defend the idea of such rights from several 
objections.  These objections fail as categorical challenges to 
grounding rights to do wrong in autonomy.  Conceptually at least, 
liberal (that is autonomy) rights to do wrong are coherent and 
possible.  However, my efforts at fending off some of the objections 
to the idea that personal autonomy is a consistently robust reason for 
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rights to do wrong were only partially successful.  Although I 
managed to weaken, narrow, and in the case of some refute the 
objections to the viability of the autonomy-based grounds of a right to 
do wrong, some doubts persist, doubts that primarily turn on 
empirical hypothesis touching on human psychology and the 
contingent scope and type of choices people may or may not possess 
in varying circumstances.  Proponents of the idea that there is not only 
a conceptual space for a moral right to do moral wrong but also that 
such a right plays a meaningful role in morality may still, therefore, 
have a few hurdles to overcome.  Although not as many as some have 
postulated.  
